We reconsider the class of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of Dubra (2001), and using methods of Imai (1983) , extend their characterization to the domain of multilateral bargaining problems. Aside from standard axioms in the literature, this result involves a new property that weakens the axiom Bilateral Consistency (Lensberg, 1988) , by making the notion of consistency dependent on how ideal values in a reduced problem change relative to the original problem.
Introduction
In this article we adopt the view that bargaining problems (Nash, 1950 ) reflect actual negotiations, and that bargaining solutions encapsulate all the strategic interactions that take place between negotiating agents. We further adopt Luce and Raiffa's (1957) view that the aspiration levels these agents hold -summarized in their ideal values -make up an important determining factor for the outcome they ultimately agree on.
Following Harsanyi (1959) , Lensberg (1988) introduced an axiom named Bilateral Consistency (BCON), 1 which states that if an agent accepts a certain 1 outcome, then he also accepts it in any two-person reduced problem that involves him.
Example.
Consider three players -1, 2 and 3 -facing the problem S, as depicted in Figure 1 , and suppose the compromise they reach is given by y := (α, α, α) for some α > 0. Suppose next that agent 1 leaves the negotiations he has reason to believe that he could successfully force or convince some other agent j to make a concession in his favor. If simultaneous challenges against more than one agent are not permitted, then i can base his beliefs about j's willingness to concede only on principles that would guide them in solving twoperson problems involving just the two of them."
The underlying assumption is that the situation i faces in the two-person problem is comparable to the situation he faces in S. However, if a solution is meant to reflect the outcome of actual negotiations, and ideal points are pertinent to the outcomes they lead to, this assumption may not always hold.
As the above example shows, the ideal values of two agents -and therefore also their bargaining attitudes with respect to one another -may be very different in the two-person reduced problem than in the original situation. As a result, what agent i can get from j in the reduced problem may not accurately reflect . 3 As such, Anonymity may be too strong a requirement, and we do not impose it.
Our main result is that CCON, combined with several standard (and uncontroversial) properties, characterizes a class of weighted lexicographic extensions of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Imai, 1983; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975 ).
The Kalai-Smorodinsky -or KS -solution is known to be inefficient in a large class of problems (Roth, 1979 ); Imai's lexicographic maxmin -or leximin -solution is a lexicographic version of the KS solution that yields efficient outcomes on the full domain. Dubra (2001) defined and characterized a class of weighted lexicographic KS solutions on the specific domain of two-person problems. The family of solutions considered in this paper, and the associated characterization, may be seen as multilateral generalizations of Dubra's results.
This paper fits into the broader literature on lexicographic solutions. Examples of this literature, aside from other work on the (symmetric) lexicographic KS solution (Chang and Liang, 1998; Driesen, 2012) , include lexicographic versions of the egalitarian solution ; Thomson and Lensberg, 1989; Nieto, 1992; Chang and Hwang, 1999; Chen, 2000) and the equal-loss solution Chun and Peters, 1991 ). For problems with claims, lexicographic extensions of the proportional solution (Chun and Thomson, 1992) and the extended claims-egalitarian solution (Bossert, 1993) were studied by del Carmen Marco Gil (1995) . The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces relevant definitions and notations. Section 3 contains the main result, a characterization of the family of weighted lexicographic KS solutions described above, and Section 4 discusses the independence of the axioms. Section 5 concludes.
Preliminaries

The Bargaining Problem
There is an infinite, countable population of agents, indexed by the set of natural Given N ∈ N , a bargaining problem -in short, a problem -is defined by a subset S of R N , that is non-empty, closed, convex and comprehensive (i.e., for all x, y ∈ R N , if x ∈ S and x y, then y ∈ S), contains a point z >0, and is further such that S ∩ R N + is bounded. The interpretation is as follows. An outcome or point x ∈ R N represents a payoff profile for the agents in N , in the sense that each x i , i ∈ N , specifies the utility realized by player i. The feasible set S represents all outcomes attainable by the players in N . The outcome0 -the disagreement point -is the outcome that obtains if agents fail to find a compromise. Note that normalizing this point to0 is without loss of generality. The condition that the feasible set holds outcomes that strictly dominate the disagreement point, represents the notion that all participating agents have some stake in the negotiations.
For each N ∈ N , let Σ N be the family of all problems for N , and let Σ := N ∈N Σ N be the family of all such problems. A bargaining solution -in short, a solution -is a real-valued function ϕ defined on Σ, that assigns for each N ∈ N , and to each S ∈ Σ N , a single outcome ϕ(S) in S. This outcome, also 4 Vector inequalities: , ≥, >.
called the solution outcome, represents the agreement the agents in N reach in the problem S.
Standard Axioms
This section restates a number of standard axioms for bargaining solutions. This requires some additional notation.
Given N ∈ N , and given S ∈ Σ N , the set of Pareto-optimal points in S is defined as P (S) := {x ∈ S | y ≥ x implies y / ∈ S}. For x, y ∈ R N , xy is a vector in R N with (xy) i := x i y i for all i ∈ N . If there is a real number β such that y i = β for all i ∈ N , then xy is also denoted βx. Furthermore, xS := {xy | y ∈ S}. Given a permutation π of N , and a vector
For Q ∈ N with Q ⊂ N , and x ∈ R N , the vector y in R Q with y i = x i for all i ∈ Q, is denoted x Q . 5 Then S −i denotes the closure of the set {x N \{i} | x ∈ S and x u(S)}. Finally, if two points x, y ∈ R N are proportional -i.e., x = βy for some β > 0 -then we write x ∝ y.
In our statement of the axioms, we omit the phrase 'For all N ∈ N and
Strong Individual Rationality (SIR). ϕ(S) >0.
Pareto Optimality (PO). ϕ(S) ∈ P (S).
Homogeneity (HOM).
For all real β 0, ϕ(βS) = βϕ(S).
Scale Invariance (SI). For all a ∈ R N + , ϕ(aS) = aϕ(S).
Anonymity (AN).
For all permutations π of N , ϕ(π(S)) = π(ϕ(S)).
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). For all
IIA other than Ideal Point (IIIA). For all T ∈ Σ N with ϕ(S) ∈ T ⊆ S and u(T ) = u(S), ϕ(T ) = ϕ(S).
Restricted IIA (RIIA). For all T ∈ Σ N with ϕ(S) ∈ T ⊆ S and u(T ) ∝ u(S), ϕ(T ) = ϕ(S).
5 Inclusion is denoted ⊆, and strict inclusion ⊂.
Individual Monotonicity (IM). For all T ∈ Σ N with T ⊆ S and
Roth (1977) introduced and discussed IIIA. Dubra (2001) introduced the weaker axiom RIIA. The property IM was introduced by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) , but the version presented here is due to Imai (1983) . The other properties are well known, and require no further elaboration. Lensberg (1988) introduced the axiom Bilateral Consistency, discussed in the introduction. Given Q, N ∈ N with Q ⊂ N , and y ∈ S ∩ R N + , let m y Q (S) be the slice of S through y, parallel to R Q -i.e., m
Bilateral Consistency and Conditional Consistency
Note that m y Q (S) is a well-defined problem in Σ Q . Then Bilateral Consistency is as follows (again, stated for all N ∈ N and S ∈ Σ N ).
Bilateral Consistency (BCON). If ϕ(S)
0 , then for all Q ⊂ N with |Q| = 2 and for all T ∈ Σ Q with T := m
We propose Conditional Consistency, an axiom that imposes BCON under the added condition that the two considered agents' ideal values change proportionally.
Conditional Consistency (CCON).
If ϕ(S) 0 , then for all Q ⊂ N with |Q| = 2 and T ∈ Σ Q with T := m
The axiom CCON is weaker than BCON, and thus satisfied by solutions such as the Nash solution (Nash, 1950) , the proportional solutions (Kalai, 1977b) , and the lexicographic egalitarian solution (Thomson and Lensberg, 1989) . It is further satisfied by the KS solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975 Lensberg also introduced a stronger version of BCON, that does not restrict consistency to two-person reduced problems. 6 For N ∈ N and S ∈ Σ N , the Nash solution (Nash, 1950) is defined as the unique maximizer of i∈N x i on S ∩ R N + . A proportional solution is defined as β * w where w is some vector in R N ++ , and β * := max{β | βw ∈ S}. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975 ) is defined as K(S) := β * u(S), where β * := max{β | βu(S) ∈ S}. The Raiffa solution is defined as the (possibly infinite) sum In similar fashion, we may also define a stronger version of CCON that applies to multilateral or single-agent reduced problems. However, such a strengthening of CCON turns out to be unnecessary for the purpose of this paper.
Discussion
Luce and Raiffa (1957) formulated the well-known criticism on Nash's (1950) IIA that it makes solutions too unresponsive to the geometry of the feasible set. The specific aspect they focused on was the ideal point: since ideal values represent the utilities agents may aspire to when engaging in the negotiations, they are an important psychological component to the attitudes these agents hold, and may therefore have an important influence on the outcome that is ultimately agreed on. This is illustrated by the example below: 7 whatever outcome agents 1 and 2 may ultimately agree on in problem A, if their ideal values matter in these negotiations, it is plausible that agent 2 will settle for a lower payoff in problem B.
The intuition that agent 2 will not be able to secure as high a payoff in problem B as in A is not just driven by the fact that his own ideal point is lower in the former than in the latter, but also by the fact that for agent 1 the two problems are identical in this respect. The property BCON says that they should then realize the same payoffs (α, α) in the reduced problem T as they did in the original problem S. The motivation for this type of robustness against renegotiation lies in the idea that agents evaluate the worth of tentative agreements on the basis of a particular thought exercise:
when confronted with the potential agreement y, an agent -say, agent 3 -will consider the hypothetical renegotiation of that agreement with each of his opponents. If any such renegotiation leads to a higher payoff than α, then agent 3 would conclude that he could do better than α, and that the corresponding outcome y should thus be rejected. A feasible outcome x can only be sustained as the solution outcome if no agent has a reason to oppose it on the basis of such reasoning.
While BCON seems sensible, if we accept Luce and Raiffa's argument that ideal points matter for the outcomes negotiations lead to, it becomes problematic. To see this, consider again the example from the introduction, and note that in the reduced problem T , agent 3 has a higher ideal value relative to agent 2 than in S itself. This means that in T , agent 2 would have a relatively more modest attitude towards agent 3 than in the original problem. Then does theorizing what he could get in T really help agent 3 in deciding whether y is a good offer in S? Arguably, it does not. Acknowledging that agents' ideal values play an important role in the bargaining process leads to the recognition that in problems S and T , agents 2 and 3 may stake out very different positions with respect to one another. As a result, the fact that agent 3 can hypothetically improve on the tentative agreement y by renegotiating it with agent 2, may not say very much about whether he should find that proposal acceptable in the current circumstance.
Consider next the example outlined in Figure 2 , and note that the ideal values of agents 2 and 3 in the reduced problem T are proportional to the corresponding ideal values in S. In this case, agents 2 and 3 do have a comparable mutual position with respect to one another in the two problems, and the outcome agent 3 could secure in T does tell him something about 2's willingness to concede in the original problem S. In particular, if agent 3 were able to secure a higher payoff in T than he is realizing under the proposed outcome in S, it would now serve as a clear indication that the concession agent 2 is making in S is too low. Agent 3 would then have a legitimate reason to oppose it. This reasoning is captured in CCON: a feasible outcome x can only be sustained as the solution outcome if no agent has a legitimate reason to oppose it.
It should be noted that the above discussion is only meant to motivate CCON, and should not be read as a criticism on BCON. The argument that BCON might be too strong a requirement hinges crucially on two assumptions we have made: that bargaining problems represent actual negotiations, and that in those negotiations, agents' ideal values play a crucial role. It may however be a perfectly acceptable property under other interpretations of the bargaining problem or other assumptions on the psychology of the agents. 
Then the axiom is as follows (for all N ∈ N and S ∈ Σ N ).
Weak Reduced-Game Property (WRGP). For Q ∈ N with Q ⊂ N and
The difference between WRGP and CCON lies in the definition of reduced problems. In the axiom of Peters et al., the reduced problem S y Q is based on the projection of the individually rational part of S (and that of the point y) onto the subspace R Q . In our axiom the reduced problem m y Q (S) is the slice of S, through the point y and parallel to R Q . The distinction is important: CCON does not imply WRGP, or vice versa. To see that WRGP does not imply CCON, consider a solution F that for all N ∈ N and S ∈ Σ N yields K(S) whenever |N | < 3, and
Observation 2.1 F satisfies WRGP.
Proof.
Let S ∈ Σ N with |N | 3, and without loss of generality, assume 
The following example shows that F violates CCON. 
A Family of Weighted Lexicographic KS Solutions
To formally define our solutions of interest, it is useful to first introduce the 'lexicographic maxmin ordering'. Definition. For S ∈ Σ, the lexicographic egalitarian solution ξ is defined as the unique maximum in S with respect to . That is, ξ(S) := {y ∈ S | y x for all x ∈ S}.
where b = w N u(S). The family of all such solutions is denoted by L, i.e., 
increasing the utilities of the remaining agents (call this set of remaining agents
This leads again to a point -say x 2 -from which further increase of utilities means stepping out of S. Since the total number of agents in N is finite, and since at each iteration at least one is excluded from further improvement, this procedure terminates in a finite number of steps. The resulting outcome corresponds with L w (S).
The lexicographic KS solution L (Imai, 1983 ) is the unique symmetric solution in L. Except for the two corner solutions where one player's weight is zero, the class of solutions L is a multilateral generalization of K. 
Main Result
The aim of this section is to obtain a characterization result for the above-defined solution class. from the restriction to two-player problems, K is somewhat broader than L. In particular, it allows for a specific type of lexicographic dictatorial solution.
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We first prove that solutions ϕ ∈ L satisfy the properties of Theorem 3.1.
To this end, the following Lemma is useful. To establish this result, it must be demonstrated that for any solution ϕ ∈ Σ satisfying the axioms of Theorem 3.1, there exists, up to a multiplicative constant, a unique weights vector w ∈ R N ++ such that ϕ = L w . More specifically, fixing a set of players N ∈ N and a problem S ∈ Σ N , it must be shown that there exists a weights vector w ∈ R N ++ -unique up to its restriction to the coordinates in N and a multiplicative constant -such that ϕ(S) = L w (S). The argument is similar to Proposition 2 of Imai (1983) , and it is thus useful to recall some of his notations.
• For N ∈ N , for x, y ∈ R N , let x · y denote the inner product i∈N x i y i . For
• Given N ∈ N , let e i be the vector in R N for which entry i is 1, and all others 0. For non-empty Q ⊆ N , we write i∈Q e i as e(Q).
•
• For N ∈ N , S ⊂ R N and y ∈ S, let Q(S, y) := {i ∈ N | y + εe i ∈ S for some ε > 0}. For y ∈ S with Q(S, y) = ∅, define z(S, y) := y + a(S, y) e(Q(S, y)) where a(S, y) := max {a ∈ R | y + a e(Q(S, y)) ∈ S} .
For y ∈ S with Q(S, y) = ∅, a(S, y) := 0 and z(S, y) := y, by convention. For S ∈ Σ N , let z 0 :=0 and z j := z(S, z j−1 ) for j 1. Let k be the smallest integer such that z j = z j+1 . Then for j = 1, . . . , k, define
, and a j := a(S, z j−1 ).
are referred to as the defining sequences of ξ(S).
Imai further proved the following lemma. it then follows that L w (S) = x k . Hence, it is sufficient to show that ϕ(S) = x k .
As in Imai's proof, this is established by induction. In particular, a set of auxiliary problems is constructed for each j = 1, . . . , k, and it is subsequently
shown that x j is the common solution outcome of all stage-j auxiliary problems.
This implies that x k is the common solution outcome of the final-stage auxiliary problems. The observation that x k is efficient in S is then sufficient to conclude that ϕ(S) = x k , the desired result.
The main difference between the present argument and that of Imai, lies in the induction step. By combining AN with (Q-)symmetry of the auxiliary problems, Imai asserts that agents' utilities are always updated in an egalitarian direction. Since AN is not in the axiom set of Theorem 3.1, this approach is not available to us. Instead we rely on the property CCON. Consider two-person problems H and T as in Figure 6 . Lemma 3.6 Let ϕ satisfy the properties of Theorem 3.1. For N := {1, 2} and for H, T ∈ Σ N defined as
, and
Thus, assume β < 1. We first prove the following result.
Assume that ϕ(H) ∈ T , and defineH := {x ∈ R N | x 1 + x 2 1 and x (1, 1)}.
By PO and a two-fold application of IM, ϕ(H) = ϕ(H). Let k ∈ N \ N , define Q := {1, 2, k}, and for x ∈ R Q , represent the utility of agent k by the third coordinate (i.e., x = (x 1 , x 2 , x k )). Let H , T ∈ Σ Q with H := cch {(1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} and
Then H is the convex comprehensive hull of all (x, 1) ∈ R Q with x ∈H.
Similarly, T is the convex comprehensive hull of all (x, 0), (y, 1) ∈ R Q with
x ∈H and y ∈ T . By PO and CCON, ϕ(H ) = (ϕ(H), 1). Since ϕ(H) ∈ T ,
Then ϕ(T ) = ϕ(H) by CCON. This establishes (2) . ϕ(T ) = (1 − β, β), contradicting the initial assumption that ϕ(T ) < (β, β).
Consider again the problem S 1 , introduced above. It is clear that Lemma 3.6 only has bite whenever (
is not known, the possibility that this condition is violated cannot be excluded. Therefore, it is necessary to approximate this solution outcome. In particular, we construct intermediate problems for which the condition is satisfied, and show that the solution outcomes of these problems converge to the desired outcome. by α j := i∈N x j for each j. By part i) of Lemma 3.5 and the definition of L w , it is sufficient to show ϕ(S) = x k . This is achieved by induction on a set of auxiliary problems.
Let p 1 :=0 and for j = 2, . . . , k, let p j := e(N \ Q j ). Then
20
These problems are exactly as in Proposition 2 of Imai. Consider the problem S j . The set H(e(N ), α j ) = {x ∈ R N | e(N ) · x α j } is a halfspace, and since α j = i∈N x j i = e(N ) · x j , it has x j in its boundary. Furthermore, since
N S) e(N ); therefore, x j is a Pareto optimal point in the set H(e(N ), α j ) ∩ (e(N ) − R N + ). Take some 1 j j, and observe that
It is a N \ Q j -symmetric half-space through the point x j that does not restrict the utilities of agents in Q j . Since Q j ⊆ Q j , it thus also leaves the utilities of agents in Q j free. Furthermore, since x
, and furthermore, such that x j ∈ P (S j ). The problem S j (with j 1) is the intersection of S j with a half-space that now puts a restriction on the utilities of agents in Q j \ Q j+1 . The problems S j and S j are clear. Further illustration of these auxiliary problems by means of an example, can be found in the Appendix.
The following claim says that these auxiliary problems are all normalized in the sense that their ideal points are equal to the unit vector. The argument is similar to Imai's, and thus relegated to the Appendix.
Observe that ϕ(S 0 ) = x 0 . Thus, assume ϕ(S j−1 ) = x j−1 . The aim is to show that this implies ϕ(S j ) = x j . To this end it is useful to define the class of intermediate problems between S j−1 and S j :
Note that for all α ∈ [α j−1 , α j ], T α is Q j -symmetric and u(T α ) = e(N ).
Proof.
Since ϕ(S j−1 ) = x j−1 by assumption, and x j−1 N \Q j = x j N \Q j , the claim is trivially true when α = α j−1 . Thus, take α ∈ (α j−1 , α j ]. Since
By part ii) of Lemma 3.5 this implies S j−1
Hence, by an |N |-fold application of IM, ϕ(T α ) x j−1 . By the definition, if for some x,
Claim 3 There exists anᾱ ∈ (α j−1 , α j ] such that
Proof.
application of IM, PO, and part ii) of Lemma 3.5, h is continuous and mono-
• Since x
• By PO, ϕ(S j ) ∈ P (S j ). Then either ϕ(S j ) = x j , or there exists an i ∈ N -and thus by Claim 2, an i ∈ Q j -such that
By continuity and monotonicity of h, these observations imply thatᾱ :
If |Q j | = 1, then Claim 2 is sufficient to conclude that ϕ(S j ) = x j , since ϕ satisfies PO. Thus, assume |Q j | 2. Take Q ⊆ Q j with |Q| = 2, and without loss of generality, assume Q = {1, 2}. Furthermore, fix some α ∈ [α j−1 ,ᾱ).
Claim 4 Let y ∈ R Q with y := (ϕ(T α )) Q , and define problems H, T ∈ Σ Q by
where β := 1/(y 1 + y 2 ).
Proof. Since i∈N w i = 1, w 1 + w 2 = 1 − i∈N \Q w i . Hence,
This establishes (3). To prove (4), note first that
. Then similar to the above,
Furthermore,
Finally, the set
does not restrict the utilities of the agents in Q, and may thus be ignored. Combining these three observations, we obtain
This establishes (4).
Claim 5 Outcomes y and x j Q are proportional.
Proof. By SI and CCON,
Moreover, by the choice of α, y < x j Q
(1, 1), and thus ϕ(T ) < (β, β). Then by Claim 4 and Lemma 3.6, ϕ(T ) = ϕ(H). Since x j Q j = a j w Q j , this implies
Proof.
We may repeat Claims 4 and 5 for all pairs of agents in Q j . This leads to the conclusion that (ϕ(T α )) Q j and x j Q j are proportional. By continuity of h, this implies that there exists a γ > 0 such that
By definition ofᾱ, γx 
The rest of the proof is similar to Proposition 2 of Imai, and thus relegated to the Appendix.
Remark.
Without CCON, the axioms of Dubra (2001) 
Further weakening RIIA to IIIA admits solutions, akin to lexicographic monotone path solutions 
Independence of the Axioms
The purpose of this Section is to investigate the independence of the axioms of Theorem 3.1. 
Strong Individual Rationality
To show that SIR is not implied by the other axioms of Theorem 3.1, consider the following solution.
Definition.
For N ∈ N and x, y ∈ R N , x * y if and only if there is a j ∈ N such that x j > y j and x i = y i for all i ∈ N with i < j. Furthermore, we must have y 1 z 1 . Suppose that y 1 > z 1 . Since y Q ∈ T , this would imply
. . , k − 1}, and
Finally, to see that D satisfies SI, consider v, w ∈ R N , and assume that v * w. Then there is a j ∈ N such that v j > w j , and v i = w i for all i ∈ N with i < j. Then for a ∈ R Roth (1979) showed that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K violates PO. On the other hand, it is immediate that K satisfies SIR and SI. K further satisfies IM, IIIA, and CCON. 
Pareto Optimality
Proof.
Let N ∈ N and S ∈ Σ N , and let β * be such that K(S) = β * u(S).
To see that K satisfies IM, consider T ⊆ S with T −i = S −i for some i ∈ N , and defineβ := max{β | βu(T ) ∈ S}. Since u j (T ) = u j (S) for all j ∈ N \ i and u i (T ) u i (S),β β * , and thusβu j (T ) K j (S) for all j ∈ N \ i. Sincê βu(T ) and K(S) are weakly Pareto optimal in S,βu i (T )
To see that K satisfies IIIA, consider T ∈ Σ N with K(S) ∈ T ⊆ S and
To see that K satisfies CCON, let |N | 3, and assume without loss of generality that u(S) = e(N ); then K(S) is the maximal feasible point in egalitarian direction. Let Q ⊂ N with |Q| = 2, let T ∈ Σ Q with T := m y Q (S) and y := K(S), and assume that u(T ) ∝ (u(S)) Q . Note that y Q is the maximal point in T that lies in egalitarian direction. Since u(T ) ∝ (u(S)) Q , this implies
Scale Invariance
Consider the lexicographic egalitarian solution ξ, and note that by Lemma 3. 
Individual Monotonicity
Consider the Nash solution, here denoted by ϕ N . It is obvious that it satisfies SIR. Lensberg (1988) showed that it further satisfies PO, SI, IIIA, and CCON.
To see that it violates IM, consider N := {1, 2} and S, T ∈ Σ N with S := cch{(1/2, 1), (1, 1/2)} and T := {(1/2, 1), (1, 0)}. Then T ⊆ S and
Conditional Consistency
Consider the solution that for any N ∈ N is equal to L w ∈ L, with w such that the lowest-index agent in N has weight |N |, and all others weight 1. Since CCON is the only axiom that involves problem reduction it follows from Proposition In the rest of this section, we provide an alternative characterization of L, that makes use of slightly weaker axioms than Theorem 3.1. We then demonstrate that for these weaker axioms, logical independence is unproblematic.
An Alternative Characterization of L
Imai (1983) introduced the following axiom:
Combined Individual Monotonicity (CIM). For N ∈ N and S, T ∈ Σ N with T ⊆ S and
CIM is directly implied by IM, and its interpretation is analogous: no individual agent benefits from a contraction of the feasible set, that leaves unaltered the maximally attainable alternatives of all agents.
We further introduce the following weaker version of CCON. By SIR and IIIA, ϕ(S ) = ϕ(S) =: y. Using this, we now demonstrate that 
Since u(T ) = u(T ), it follows by SIR and IIIA that ϕ(T ) = ϕ(T ). Furthermore, it implies u(T ) ∝ (u(S )) Q , and thus by iCCON, ϕ(T ) = (ϕ(S )) Q . Since ϕ(S ) = ϕ(S), this implies ϕ(T ) = (ϕ(S)) Q , as desired. Definition.
, where
Observation 4.4 G does not satisfy IIIA.
Proof.
Let N := {1, 2, 3}, and consider S := H(e(N ), 3/2) ∩ (e(N ) − R N + ) and T := {x ∈ S | x 1 + x 2 1}. Since there is no i ∈ N such that
i.e. the premise of IIIA is satisfied. However, since 1, 2) . Hence, G(T ) = G(S). is used in S and T . Since
To see that G satisfies iCCON, assume that S = cch (S ∩ R N + ). If |N | = 2, then the condition S −i = cch {u j (S) | j ∈ N \ {i}} is trivially satisfied for both i ∈ N , such that G coincides with L. Suppose |N | > 2, let Q ⊂ N with |Q| = 2, and consider T ∈ Σ Q with T := m y Q (S) and y := G(S). Without loss of generality, assume Q := {1, 2}. We distinguish between two cases.
• G(S) = L w (S) where w 1 = w 2 :
Since G satisfies SI, we may assume without loss of generality that u(S) = e(N ). Define γ := 1 − k∈N \Q y k . Since y ∈ S it follows by convexity and comprehensiveness of S that (γ, 0, y N \Q ) and (0, γ, y N \Q ) are both in
Assume without loss of generality that w 1 = 1 and w 2 = 2. The latter means that S −2 = cch {e j | j ∈ N \ 2}. But then for all (x Q , y N \Q ) ∈ S, x 1 γ. Hence, u 1 (T ) = γ.
That w 1 = 1 implies cch {e j | j ∈ N \ 1} ⊂ S −1 . By convexity of S it follows that for any v in cch {e
++ there is an > 0 such that v + e(N \ 1) ∈ S −1 . This implies u 2 (T ) > γ. 
Concluding Remarks
The framework in this article assumed an infinite population of agents. All results continue to hold in a finite-population environment, provided that this population counts at least three agents. If there are only two agents in the population, then there exist other solutions that satisfy the properties of Theorem 3.1. Dubra (2001) defines such a solution: For N := {1, 2} and S ∈ Σ N ,
where
We further made the assumption that problems are comprehensive. Other than making the domain closed under the operation of problem reduction, this restriction does not play any role in our result. To see this, consider solutions ϕ defined on the domain that extends Σ to the non-comprehensive problems.
It is easily verified that any such solution, that further satisfies IIIA, yields the same outcome on a problem S as it does on the convex comprehensive hull of
S.
Finally, since a lexicographic version of the proportional solutions (Kalai, 1977b ) would satisfy both BCON and IIA, the characterization of L presented in this article, can be extended to this solution class. Note that such solutions would violate SI, a property used in the proofs of Lemma 3.6 and Claim 5;
however, in both instances, SI may be replaced by HOM.
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A.1 Solutions ϕ ∈ L satisfy IM
Consider some solution L w ∈ L with w ∈ R N ++ . Let N ∈ N , and let S and T be problems in Σ N with T ⊆ S and T −i = S −i for some i ∈ N . Since L w satisfies SI, we may assume without loss of generality that u(S) = w −1 N , where w N is the restriction of w to the agents in N . Then
Define u := u(S)u(T ) −1 , and observe that
By Equations (5) and (6) it is sufficient to show that ξ i (S) 1 ui ξ i (uT ). This is done in two steps. First it is established that ξ i (S) ξ i (T ), and subsequently,
Lemma A.1 Let y ∈ T with i ∈ Q(T, y). Then Q(T, y) = Q(S, y).
Proof. Suppose there is some i ∈ Q(S, y) \ Q(T, y). Define x := x(S, y) and x := x(T, y). Since S −i = T −i and x ∈ S, there is a z ∈ T such that z j = x j for all j ∈ N \ {i}. By convexity of T it follows that λx + (1 − λ)z ∈ T for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. We have x, x y, z j = x j for all j ∈ N \ {i}, and x i > y i (since i ∈ Q(T, y)). Hence, there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that z
In essence, as long as the i-th coordinate can be further increased in problem T , it can be further increased in S as well. It follows that ξ i (S) ξ i (T ).
To show that ξ i (T ) 1 ui ξ i (uT ), define the following:
The aim is to show that x i x i .
Observation A.2 x N x and y N y (or x = x and y = y ).
Proof. Observe that ξ(T ) ∈ T , implying uξ(T ) ∈ uT . Since ξ(uT ) N z for all z ∈ uT with z = ξ(uT ), ξ(uT ) N uξ(T ) (or ξ(uT ) = uξ(T )). In other words, y N y (or y = y). Similarly, observe that ξ(uT ) ∈ uT , and thus
Since x = x if and only if y = y , the observation follows.
Proof. Clearly, if x = x and y = y , then the inequality holds trivially, and we are done. Hence, assume x N x and y N y. Recall that S 0 = H(e(N ), 1). This problem is depicted in Figure 13 (a). From S 0 one can construct the problem S 1 : it is given by H(e(N ), α 1 ) ∩ (e(N ) − R N + ). Thus, the half-space that determines S 0 slides upwards, and is intersected by a set that limits utilities to 1. The problem S 1 is the intersection of S with the half-space H(e(N ), α 1 ). Simi-larly, S 1 is the intersection of the problem S and the problem S 1 , depicted in Figure 13 (b). Note that these two problems coincide. For the first iteration this is always the case. To determine the auxiliary problems for the second iteration, one must determine S 1 . It is equal to S 1 , intersected by H(p 2 , p 2 · x 2 ), a half-space that leaves the utilities of agent 3 free, but restricts those of agents 1 and 2 in a {1, 2}-symmetric fashion. The problem S 2 is given by H(e(N ), α 2 ), intersected by that same half-space H(p 2 , p 2 · x 2 ), and the set (e(N ) − R N + ) that limits the utilities of all agents to 1. The problem S 2 is the intersection of S 2 , as depicted in Figure 15 (b), and the original problem S. The end result is depicted in Figure 16 (a). The problem 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4 (Continued)
The proof of Proposition 3.4 is concluded by the following three claims.
Claim 7 ϕ(S 1 ) = ϕ(S 1 ) = ϕ(S 1 ) = ϕ(S 1 ) = x 1 .
Proof. Since ϕ(S 0 ) = x 0 , ϕ(S 1 ) = x 1 by Claim 6. Since x 1 ∈ S 1 and x 1 ∈ S, x 1 ∈ S 1 . Then x 1 = ϕ(S 1 ) ∈ S 1 ⊆ S 1 , and by Claim 1, u(S 1 ) = u(S 1 ).
Thus by IIIA, ϕ(S 1 ) = ϕ(S 1 ) = x 1 . For all i ∈ N \ Q 2 ,
by Claim 1, u(S 1 ) = u(S Claim 8 ϕ(S j ) = ϕ(S j ) = ϕ(S j ) = ϕ(S j ) = x j for each j = 1, . . . , k (or j = 1, . . . , k − 1 for ϕ(S j )).
Proof. Consider j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and assume ϕ(S j−1 ) = ϕ(S j−1 ) = ϕ(S j−1 ) = ϕ(S j−1 ) = x j−1 . By Claim 6, ϕ(S j ) = x j . Then ϕ(S j ) = x j follows as in Claim 7. Furthermore, if j < k, then also ϕ(S j ) = x j follows as in Claim 7. What is left to show is that ϕ(S j ) = x j . To this end, it is first argued that ϕ(S j ) is an element of S j .
1. Since S j ⊆ H(e(N ), α j ), ϕ(S j ) ∈ H(e(N ), α j ). As in Claim 3, this implies ϕ i (S j ) = x j i for all i ∈ N \ Q j . From this it follows that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , j}, ϕ(S j ) ∈ H(p j , p j · x j ). Thus,
Since ϕ(S
It follows that ϕ(S j ) ∈ S j . Since S j ⊆ S, we further have ϕ(S j ) ∈ S. Thus, ϕ(S j ) ∈ S j ⊆ S j , and by Claim 1, u(S j ) = u(S j ). Then by IIIA, ϕ(S j ) = ϕ(S j ) = x j .
Claim 9 ϕ(S) = x k .
Proof. Since S k = S ∩ H(e(N ), α k ), ϕ(S) ϕ(S k ) by an |N |-fold application of IM and part ii) of Lemma 3.5. Then by Claim 8, ϕ(S) x k . The claim follows from the observation that x k ∈ P (S).
